Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game in random scale-free graphs
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Publication:3586819
Abstract: In this paper we study the cooperative behavior of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in random scale-free networks. We show that the survival of cooperation is enhanced with respect to random homogeneous graphs but, on the other hand, decreases when compared to that found in Barab'asi-Albert scale-free networks. We show that the latter decrease is related with the structure of cooperation. Additionally, we present a mean field approximation for studying evolutionary dynamics in networks with no degree-degree correlations and with arbitrary degree distribution. The mean field approach is similar to the one used for describing the disease spreading in complex networks, making a further compartmentalization of the strategists partition into degree-classes. We show that this kind of approximation is suitable to describe the behavior of the system for a particular set of initial conditions, such as the placement of cooperators in the higher-degree classes, while it fails to reproduce the level of cooperation observed in the numerical simulations for arbitrary initial configurations.
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Cited in
(21)- Evolution of public cooperation with weighted and conditional strategies
- Community structure inhibits cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma
- Evolutionary stability and the evolution of cooperation on heterogeneous graphs
- A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks
- Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma in random graphs
- Symmetry breaking in the prisoner's dilemma on two-layer dynamic multiplex networks
- Effects of topological randomness on cooperation in a deterministic Prisoner's Dilemma game
- Evolution of cooperation in continuous prisoner's dilemma games on Barabási-Albert networks with degree-dependent guilt mechanism
- Growing networks driven by the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game
- Effect of clustering in the scale-free networks on cooperative behavior
- Prisoner's dilemma on directed networks
- Large fluctuations in anti-coordination games on scale-free graphs
- The different cooperative behaviors on a kind of scale-free networks with identical degree sequence
- Mechanisms supporting cooperation for the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games
- The prisoner's dilemma in structured scale-free networks
- Heterogeneous link weight promotes the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma
- Emergence of cooperation in non-scale-free networks
- Influence of different initial distributions on robust cooperation in scale-free networks: a comparative study
- Modeling poker challenges by evolutionary game theory
- Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
- Effects of average degree on cooperation in networked evolutionary game
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