Influence of different initial distributions on robust cooperation in scale-free networks: a comparative study
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:552804)
Abstract: We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on scale-free networks for different initial distributions. We consider three types of initial distributions for cooperators and defectors: initially random distribution with different frequencies of defectors; intentional organization with defectors initially occupying the most connected nodes with different fractions of defectors; intentional assignment for cooperators occupying the most connected nodes with different proportions of defectors at the beginning. It is shown that initial configurations for cooperators and defectors can influence the stationary level of cooperation and the evolution speed of cooperation. Organizations with the vertices with highest connectivity representing individuals cooperators could exhibit the most robust cooperation and drive evolutionary process to converge fastest to the high steady cooperation in the three situations of initial distributions. Otherwise, we determine the critical initial frequencies of defectors above which the extinction of cooperators occurs for the respective initial distributions, and find that the presence of network loops and clusters for cooperators can favor the emergence of cooperation.
Recommendations
- The impact of initial cooperation fraction on the evolutionary fate in a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game
- Effect of collective influence on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games
- Evolutionary games and self-organizing cooperation
- The different cooperative behaviors on a kind of scale-free networks with identical degree sequence
- Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game in random scale-free graphs
Cites work
Cited in
(14)- Effect of collective influence on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games
- The impact of initial cooperation fraction on the evolutionary fate in a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game
- Dynamic evolution of economic networks under the influence of mergers and divestitures
- Robust exponential stability and stabilization of a class of nonlinear stochastic time-delay systems
- Successful initial positioning of non-cooperative individuals in cooperative populations effectively hinders cooperation prosperity
- Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games
- Comprehensive consideration of strategy updating promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Evolutionary dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift game
- Time scales in evolutionary game on adaptive networks
- Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
- Evolution of cooperation in a conformity-driven evolving dynamic social network
- Evolution of cooperation in public goods games with stochastic opting-out
- Leadership by example promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods game
- Cautious strategy update promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
This page was built for publication: Influence of different initial distributions on robust cooperation in scale-free networks: a comparative study
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q552804)
