Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/BF01231553MaRDI QIDQ698231zbMATHFDO

Authors Frederik Andersson

Publication date 18 September 2002

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionsignallingbilateral asymmetric informationgenetic informationsimple contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information
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Cites work

• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values

Cited in

(9)

• International charity under asymmetric information
• Private information and insurance rejections
• Adverse Selection and Security Design
• Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
• IFF YOU WANT ME, I DON'T WANT YOU
• Adverse selection and costly information acquisition in asset markets
• Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information
• Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
• Testing in Models of Asymmetric Information

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