Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/BF01231553zbMATH Open1010.91014MaRDI QIDQ698231FDOQ698231

Authors: Frederik Andersson 

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionsignallingbilateral asymmetric informationgenetic informationsimple contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• Sequential Equilibria
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
• Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance

Cited In (8)

• IFF YOU WANT ME, I DON'T WANT YOU
• Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
• Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
• International charity under asymmetric information
• Adverse selection and costly information acquisition in asset markets
• Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information
• Testing in Models of Asymmetric Information
• Adverse Selection and Security Design

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