Private information and insurance rejections

DOI10.3982/ECTA10931MaRDI QIDQ2869953zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Nathaniel Hendren

Publication date 7 January 2014

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10931

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionprivate informationinsurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Private information in life insurance, annuity, and health insurance markets
• A simple test for private information in insurance markets with heterogeneous insurance demand
• Insurance, adverse selection, and cream-skimming
• Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information
• Information design in competitive insurance markets

Cited in

(11)

• REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION
• The 2013 Lawrence R. Klein lecture: behavioral and descriptive forms of choice models
• Transparency in Structural Research
• Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling
• Competitive insurance markets with unbounded cost
• LEARNING AND EVIDENCE IN INSURANCE MARKETS
• Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
• The premium as informational cue in insurance decision making
• Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection
• Private information in life insurance, annuity, and health insurance markets
• A simple test for private information in insurance markets with heterogeneous insurance demand

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