Private information and insurance rejections

DOI10.3982/ECTA10931zbMATH Open1282.91152OpenAlexW3126043879WikidataQ37267907 ScholiaQ37267907MaRDI QIDQ2869953FDOQ2869953

Authors: Nathaniel Hendren 

Publication date: 7 January 2014

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10931

Recommendations

• Private information in life insurance, annuity, and health insurance markets
• A simple test for private information in insurance markets with heterogeneous insurance demand
• Insurance, adverse selection, and cream-skimming
• Adverse selection and bilateral asymmetric information
• Information design in competitive insurance markets

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionprivate informationinsurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (11)

• Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling
• The premium as informational cue in insurance decision making
• Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
• The 2013 Lawrence R. Klein lecture: behavioral and descriptive forms of choice models
• Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection
• Transparency in Structural Research
• A simple test for private information in insurance markets with heterogeneous insurance demand
• LEARNING AND EVIDENCE IN INSURANCE MARKETS
• Competitive insurance markets with unbounded cost
• REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION
• Private information in life insurance, annuity, and health insurance markets

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