Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
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Publication:4161038
DOI10.7916/D8NG51NK 10.2307/2296899; 10.7916/D8NG51NKzbMath0381.90021OpenAlexW2043021768MaRDI QIDQ4161038
Publication date: 1977
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296899
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