An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.02.007zbMATH Open1330.91087DBLPjournals/jet/BalkenborgM15OpenAlexW2052671165WikidataQ57937040 ScholiaQ57937040MaRDI QIDQ894059FDOQ894059

Authors Dieter Balkenborg, Miltiadis Makris

Publication date 23 November 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/375196/1/BalkenborgMakris.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcommon valuesinformed principalneutral optimum

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Informed principal problems in bilateral trading

Cites work

• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
• Cooperative games with incomplete information
• Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
• Ex post implementation
• Informed principal with correlation
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information

Cited in

(7)

• Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
• An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
• Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
• Selling with evidence
• Interim third-party selection in bargaining

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