An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.02.007zbMATH Open1330.91087DBLPjournals/jet/BalkenborgM15OpenAlexW2052671165WikidataQ57937040 ScholiaQ57937040MaRDI QIDQ894059FDOQ894059
Authors: Dieter Balkenborg, Miltiadis Makris 
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/375196/1/BalkenborgMakris.pdf
Recommendations
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
- Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
- Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
- Ex post implementation
- Informed principal with correlation
- Cooperative games with incomplete information
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
- Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
- Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring
Cited In (7)
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- Selling with evidence
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
- Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
- A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- Interim third-party selection in bargaining
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