A general principal-agent setting with non-differentiable mechanisms: Some examples
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029228 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- An Increasing Continuous Singular Function
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Monopoly and product quality
- Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
- On countervailing incentives
- Optimal Control Problems with Mixed Control-Phase Variable Equality and Inequality Constraints
- Optimal bunching without optimal control
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
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