A general principal-agent setting with non-differentiable mechanisms: Some examples
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2008.11.002zbMATH Open1158.91368OpenAlexW2124751883MaRDI QIDQ1013522FDOQ1013522
Authors: X. Ruiz del Portal 
Publication date: 20 April 2009
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.11.002
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Cites Work
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Monopoly and product quality
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An Increasing Continuous Singular Function
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Optimal Control Problems with Mixed Control-Phase Variable Equality and Inequality Constraints
- Optimal bunching without optimal control
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- On countervailing incentives
- Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
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