Credit and inflation under borrower's lack of commitment

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.015zbMath1255.91278OpenAlexW2158967153MaRDI QIDQ643262

Antonia Díaz, Fernando Perera-Tallo

Publication date: 28 October 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.015

zbMATH Keywords

monetary policyrisk sharingFriedman ruleself-enforcing debtexistence of credit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Money, credit and banking
• Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy
• Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information
• Societal benefits of illiquid bonds.
• Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage
• A Difficulty with the Optimum Quantity of Money
• Liquidity Constrained Markets Versus Debt Constrained Markets
• Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
• Bubbles and Self-Enforcing Debt
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment

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