Money and credit with limited commitment and theft

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.12.002MaRDI QIDQ981046zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel Sanches, Stephen D. Williamson

Publication date 8 July 2010

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20690/2/MPRA_paper_20690.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

creditimperfect memorymoneyoptimal monetary policytheft

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• CREDIT AND GROWTH UNDER LIMITED COMMITMENT
• Credit and inflation under borrower's lack of commitment
• Limited commitment, money, and credit
• Limited commitment and the legal restrictions theory of the demand for money
• Money is memory

Cites work

• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information
• Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium
• Money is memory
• On Efficient Distribution with Private Information

Cited in

(14)

• Money is memory
• Optimal monetary interventions in credit markets
• Counterfeiting, screening and government policy
• Indeterminacy in credit economies
• Asset prices and standing facilities in a monetary economy
• Reallocation of production inputs in a monetary economy
• Limited monitoring and the essentiality of money
• Money and credit as means of payment: a new monetarist approach
• Scarce collateral, the term premium, and quantitative easing
• Limited commitment and the legal restrictions theory of the demand for money
• Cryptocurrency and double spending history: transactions with zero confirmation
• Credit, money and (pseudo-)anonymity
• Introduction to search theory and applications
• Essential interest-bearing money

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