Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement
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Cites work
- A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
- Debt Constrained Asset Markets
- Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
- Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement
- Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
- Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
- Risk-Bearing and the Theory of Income Distribution
Cited in
(11)- Entrepreneurs, legal institutions and firm dynamics
- Optimal lending contracts with long run borrowing constraints
- The distributive impact of reforms in credit enforcement: evidence from Indian debt recovery tribunals
- Heterogeneous firms and the impact of government policy on welfare and informality
- On entrepreneurial risk-taking and the macroeconomic effects of financial constraints
- Endogenous growth and adverse selection in entrepreneurship
- Adverse selection, endogenous borrowing constraints and firm growth
- Repayment flexibility and risk taking: experimental evidence from credit contracts
- A tractable model of limited enforcement and the life-cycle dynamics of firms
- Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
- Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement
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