Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement
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Publication:666302
DOI10.1007/S10436-009-0122-1zbMATH Open1233.91172OpenAlexW2100934125MaRDI QIDQ666302FDOQ666302
Authors: Alexander Monge-Naranjo 
Publication date: 8 March 2012
Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-009-0122-1
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Cites Work
- Debt Constrained Asset Markets
- Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
- Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
- Risk-Bearing and the Theory of Income Distribution
- Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
- A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
- Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement
Cited In (11)
- Entrepreneurs, legal institutions and firm dynamics
- Optimal lending contracts with long run borrowing constraints
- The distributive impact of reforms in credit enforcement: evidence from Indian debt recovery tribunals
- Endogenous growth and adverse selection in entrepreneurship
- Heterogeneous firms and the impact of government policy on welfare and informality
- On entrepreneurial risk-taking and the macroeconomic effects of financial constraints
- Adverse selection, endogenous borrowing constraints and firm growth
- A tractable model of limited enforcement and the life-cycle dynamics of firms
- Repayment flexibility and risk taking: experimental evidence from credit contracts
- Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
- Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement
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