Contracting to compete for flows

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.10.003MaRDI QIDQ1693193zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jason Roderick Donaldson, Giorgia Piacentino

Publication date 11 January 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

benchmarkingcredit ratingsoptimal contractingdelegated asset managementfund flows

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Portfolio theory (91G10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Fund managers' competition for investment flows based on relative performance
• Mutual fund competition in the presence of dynamic flows
• Asset pricing under optimal contracts
• Institutionalization, delegation, and asset prices
• Asset management, high water mark and flow of funds

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3566481 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on revelation of information for joint production
• Delegated portfolio management
• Efficient risk sharing: the last frontier
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Product Differentiation, Search Costs, and Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: A Case Study of S&P 500 Index Funds
• Should we regulate financial information?
• Testing in Models of Asymmetric Information
• The Theory of Syndicates and Linear Sharing Rules
• The informativeness principle without the first-order approach

Cited in

(3)

• Dynamic contracting in asset management under the investor-partner-manager relationship
• Fund managers' competition for investment flows based on relative performance
• Contractors for flows

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