Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.11.009MaRDI QIDQ2173420zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Pierpaolo Battigalli, Paolo Leonetti, Fabio Maccheroni

Publication date 22 April 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.02918

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral equivalenceinvariant transformationsextensive game structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Abstract: Two extensive game structures with imperfect information are said to be behaviorally equivalent if they share the same map (up to relabelings) from profiles of structurally reduced strategies to induced terminal paths. We show that this is the case if and only if one can be transformed into the other through a composition of two elementary transformations, commonly known as extquotedblleft Interchanging of Simultaneous Moves extquotedblright and extquotedblleft Coalescing Moves/Sequential Agent Splitting. extquotedblright

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Cited in

(8)

• On some connections between negotiating while fighting and bargaining between a buyer and seller
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• Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games
• Structural consistency and strategic independence in extensive games

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