On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games

DOI10.2168/LMCS-9(1:7)2013zbMath1260.91038OpenAlexW2025991831MaRDI QIDQ4913770

Hugo Gimbert, Véronique Bruyère, Julie De Pril, Thomas Brihaye

Publication date: 9 April 2013

Published in: Logical Methods in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2168/lmcs-9(1:7)2013

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumreachability objectivessecure equilibriumturn-based quantitative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

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