Subgame-perfect -equilibria in perfect information games with sigma-discrete discontinuities
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Publication:281206
DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0868-9zbMATH Open1367.91008OpenAlexW2093355229WikidataQ59438545 ScholiaQ59438545MaRDI QIDQ281206FDOQ281206
Authors: Arkadi Predtetchinski, János Flesch
Publication date: 10 May 2016
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0868-9
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Cites Work
- Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games.
- Perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoffs
- Perfect-information games with lower-semicontinuous payoffs
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Non-existence of subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- Perfect information games where each player acts only once
- Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games
- On refinements of subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibrium
- Cantor sets in Prohorov spaces
- ON GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION: EQUILIBRIA, ε–EQUILIBRIA AND APPROXIMATION BY SIMPLE GAMES
Cited In (10)
- Subgame-perfection in free transition games
- Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state
- Introduction to the symposium on discontinuous games
- On refinements of subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibrium
- A note on discontinuity and approximate equilibria in games with infinitely many players
- Perfect-information games with lower-semicontinuous payoffs
- Perfect information games where each player acts only once
- Perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoffs
- Subgame-perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in perfect information games with common preferences at the limit
- \(\varepsilon\)-subgame perfectness of an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium in linear-state games
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