Coalgebraic analysis of subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite games without discounting

DOI10.1017/S0960129515000365MaRDI QIDQ5269005zbMATH OpenDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Samson Abramsky, Viktor Winschel

Publication date 14 June 2017

Published in Mathematical Structures in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.4537

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Abstract: We present a novel coalgebraic formulation of infinite extensive games. We define both the game trees and the strategy profiles by possibly infinite systems of corecursive equations. Certain strategy profiles are proved to be subgame perfect equilibria using a novel proof principle of predicate coinduction. We characterize all subgame perfect equilibria for the dollar auction game. The economically interesting feature is that in order to prove these results we do not need to rely on continuity assumptions on the payoffs which amount to discounting the future. In particular, we prove a form of one-deviation principle without any such assumptions. This suggests that coalgebra supports a more adequate treatment of infinite-horizon models in game theory and economics.

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Cited in

(15)

• Coinductive predicates and final sequences in a fibration
• From Lawvere to Brandenburger-Keisler: interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference
• ``Backward coinduction, Nash equilibrium and the rationality of escalation
• A compositional treatment of iterated open games
• Infinite Horizon Extensive Form Games, Coalgebraically
• Duality, intensionality, and contextuality: philosophy of category theory and the categorical unity of science in Samson Abramsky
• Multigames and strategies, coalgebraically
• The game semantics of game theory
• Structure in machine learning
• A simple case of rationality of escalation
• Long-term values in Markov decision processes, (co)algebraically
• Coinductive predicates and final sequences in a fibration
• Whither semantics?
• Testing randomness by Matching Pennies
• The category of node-and-choice forms, with subcategories for choice-sequence forms and choice-set forms

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