Coalgebraic analysis of subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite games without discounting

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Publication:5269005

DOI10.1017/S0960129515000365zbMATH Open1364.91026DBLPjournals/mscs/AbramskyW17arXiv1210.4537WikidataQ57006399 ScholiaQ57006399MaRDI QIDQ5269005FDOQ5269005

Samson Abramsky, Viktor Winschel

Publication date: 14 June 2017

Published in: Mathematical Structures in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We present a novel coalgebraic formulation of infinite extensive games. We define both the game trees and the strategy profiles by possibly infinite systems of corecursive equations. Certain strategy profiles are proved to be subgame perfect equilibria using a novel proof principle of predicate coinduction. We characterize all subgame perfect equilibria for the dollar auction game. The economically interesting feature is that in order to prove these results we do not need to rely on continuity assumptions on the payoffs which amount to discounting the future. In particular, we prove a form of one-deviation principle without any such assumptions. This suggests that coalgebra supports a more adequate treatment of infinite-horizon models in game theory and economics.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.4537





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