A simple case of rationality of escalation

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-40206-7_15zbMATH Open1395.91062arXiv1306.2284OpenAlexW1754582336MaRDI QIDQ2848948FDOQ2848948

Authors: Pierre Lescanne 

Publication date: 13 September 2013

Published in: Algebra and Coalgebra in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Escalation is the fact that in a game (for instance an auction), the agents play forever. It is not necessary to consider complex examples to establish its rationality. In particular, the $0,1$-game is an extremely simple infinite game in which escalation arises naturally and rationally. In some sense, it can be considered as the paradigm of escalation. Through an example of economic games, we show the benefit economics can take of coinduction.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.2284

Recommendations

• ``Backward coinduction, Nash equilibrium and the rationality of escalation
• The logic of backward induction
• Coalgebraic analysis of subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite games without discounting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4083411
• Infinite coordination games

zbMATH Keywords

escalationinfinite gamecoinductionauctioncrashsequential gamespeculative bubbleeconomic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cited In (1)

• ``Backward coinduction, Nash equilibrium and the rationality of escalation

This page was built for publication: A simple case of rationality of escalation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2848948)