Equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90104-PMaRDI QIDQ1196196zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alejandro Neme, Luis G. Quintas

Publication date 17 December 1992

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90104-p

zbMATH Keywords

finite automatapayoff discontinuity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• The strength of a little perfection
• Two-person repeated games with finite automata
• Finite automata equilibria with discounting
• Finite complexity and the folk theorem in repeated games

Cites work

• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• Small talk and cooperation: A note on bounded rationality
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata

Cited in

(7)

• Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
• The repeated public goods game: a solution using tit-for-tat and the Lindahl point
• Finite automata equilibria with discounting
• The strength of a little perfection
• Nash equilibrium strategies in repeated games with and without cost of implementation
• Subgame perfect equilibrium of repeated games with implementation costs
• Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs

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