Experimental evidence on English auctions: oral outcry versus clock
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Publication:3096859
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3837235 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- An experimental test of alternative models of bidding in ascending auctions
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
- Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions
- Cursed Equilibrium
- Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data.
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
Cited in
(4)- An experimental test of alternative models of bidding in ascending auctions
- Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
- A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels
- Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
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