Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2107164 (Why is no real title available?)
- A market-based mechanism for allocating space shuttle secondary payload priority
- A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
- Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
- Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
- Budget feasible mechanism design, from prior-free to Bayesian
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Knapsack auctions
- On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
Cited in
(6)- Procurement with cost and noncost attributes: cost-sharing mechanisms
- Duality in procurement design
- Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation
- Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints
- Budget feasible procurement auctions
- Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
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