Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem

DOI10.2307/2297362MaRDI QIDQ3942696zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Froystein Gjesdal

Publication date 1982

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297362

zbMATH Keywords

agency information problemgeneralized agency modelimperfect informationincentive purpusesrisk sharingvalue of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cited in

(14)

• Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions
• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
• Optimal incentives and asymmetric distribution of information
• Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts
• The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
• On incentives, temptation and self-control
• Redistribution by means of lotteries
• Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
• Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies
• All-or-nothing payments
• The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
• Information design in the principal-agent problem
• Information orders in screening problems
• Information in tournaments under limited liability

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