Correlation-robust analysis of single item auction

DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.13MaRDI QIDQ5236194zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xiaohui Bei, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, N. V. Gravin

Publication date 15 October 2019

Published in Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.13

zbMATH Keywords

correlation robust-frameworksequential posted-price mechanismsingle-item auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(12)

• Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
• Correlation-robust auction design
• Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching
• Approximation algorithms for the partial assignment problem
• Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
• Sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations
• Separation in correlation-robust monopolist problem with budget
• Optimal design for multi-item auctions: a robust optimization approach
• Correlation robust stochastic optimization
• Lookahead auctions with pooling
• Separation in distributionally robust monopolist problem
• Bayesian optimal stopping with maximum value knowledge

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