Separation in correlation-robust monopolist problem with budget

MaRDI QIDQ4608028zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Pinyan Lu, N. V. Gravin

Publication date 15 March 2018

Full work available at URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3175440

zbMATH Keywords

correlation-robust frameworkdual linear programmingmonopolist seller

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(8)

• Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
• Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
• Risk-robust mechanism design for a prospect-theoretic buyer
• Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching
• A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
• Separation in distributionally robust monopolist problem
• Bayesian optimal stopping with maximum value knowledge
• Distributionally robust optimization

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