Buy-many mechanisms for many unit-demand buyers

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_2MaRDI QIDQ6609124zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng, Christos Tzamos

Publication date 20 September 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_2

zbMATH Keywords

buy-many mechanismsmulti-item mechanism designsequential item pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6783427 (Why is no real title available?)
• Matroid prophet inequalities
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• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• Online contention resolution schemes
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• Revelation gap for pricing from samples
• Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
• Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design

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