The value of preference information in agency relationships

DOI10.1023/A:1009694517754zbMATH Open0937.91040OpenAlexW1495909804MaRDI QIDQ1964779FDOQ1964779

Authors: Rudolf Vetschera 

Publication date: 23 February 2000

Published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1009694517754

Recommendations

• A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
• The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
• The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures
• Information provision before a contract is offered

zbMATH Keywords

value of informationagency theorypreference information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

Cited In (5)

• Information provision before a contract is offered
• A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
• The value of knowing that you do not know
• Value of communication in agencies
• The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures

Uses Software

• VPI

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