Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2016.02.053zbMath1346.90046MaRDI QIDQ323245

Knut Richter, Grigory Pishchulov

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/optimal-contract-design-in-the-joint-economic-lot-size-problem-with-multidimensional-asymmetric-information(dfb3b7be-c434-4440-ae4c-89b5b1bc4903).html

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information; nonlinear programming; supply chain coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C30: Nonlinear programming

90B06: Transportation, logistics and supply chain management

90B05: Inventory, storage, reservoirs

91B44: Economics of information

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