Secure collaborative supply chain planning and inverse optimization -- the JELS model
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Publication:621669
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2010.08.018zbMath1206.90015OpenAlexW2061802713MaRDI QIDQ621669
Richard Pibernik, Axel Schröpfer, Florian Kerschbaum, Ying-ying Zhang
Publication date: 28 January 2011
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.018
Related Items (3)
Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information ⋮ Supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and partial vertical integration ⋮ Inverse optimization of integer programming games for parameter estimation arising from competitive retail location selection
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