Optimal incentives and asymmetric distribution of information

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(93)90159-KzbMATH Open0800.90270OpenAlexW2039211869MaRDI QIDQ1310705FDOQ1310705

Authors: Thomas Hartmann-Wendels 

Publication date: 2 January 1994

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(93)90159-k

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Economic Comparability of Information Systems
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Informational Equilibrium
• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models

Cited In (2)

• Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility
• The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers

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