Optimal incentives and asymmetric distribution of information

DOI10.1016/0377-2217(93)90159-KMaRDI QIDQ1310705zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas Hartmann-Wendels

Publication date 2 January 1994

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(93)90159-k

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites work

• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
• Economic Comparability of Information Systems
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• Informational Equilibrium
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

Cited in

(2)

• Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility
• The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers

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