Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard*
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Publication:3065347
Recommendations
- Employment and wages with sector-specific shocks and worker moral hazard
- Wage rigidities, unemployment compensations and Pareto optimality
- Downward wage rigidity in a model of equal treatment contracting
- Unemployment risk and wage differentials
- Unemployment insurance in a sticky-price model with worker moral hazard
- Optimal monetary policy and downward nominal wage rigidity in frictional labor markets
- Unemployment insurance and moral hazard in employment
- WAGE ADJUSTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCY
- Nominal and real wage rigidity in a friction model
Cites work
- Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
- Dynamic programming solution of incentive constrained problems
- Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard*
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- Incentives in competitive search equilibrium
- Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
- Private Information, Wage Bargaining and Employment Fluctuations
- The unemployment volatility puzzle: is wage stickiness the answer?
Cited in
(7)- Business cycles, unemployment insurance, and the calibration of matching models
- Do entry wages increase when severance pay drops? Not in recessions
- Constrained labor supply and risk-aversion
- Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard*
- Employment and wages with sector-specific shocks and worker moral hazard
- Downward wage rigidity in a model of equal treatment contracting
- Downwards wage rigidity, endogenous separations and firm training
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