Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard*
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Publication:3065347
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9442.2010.01625.xzbMath1202.91140OpenAlexW3126091267MaRDI QIDQ3065347
James S. Costain, Marcel L. Jansen
Publication date: 5 January 2011
Published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/DocumentosTrabajo/06/Fic/dt0632e.pdf
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Business cycles, unemployment insurance, and the calibration of matching models, Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard*
Cites Work
- Dynamic programming solution of incentive constrained problems
- Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium
- Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard*
- Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium
- Private Information, Wage Bargaining and Employment Fluctuations
- The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment