Unemployment insurance in a sticky-price model with worker moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2011.03.002zbMATH Open1217.91100OpenAlexW2019721009MaRDI QIDQ550832FDOQ550832

Authors: Gregory E. Givens 

Publication date: 13 July 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://capone.mtsu.edu/berc/working/insurance.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

sticky pricesunemploymentefficiency wagespartial insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory*
• Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
• Methods to estimate dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models
• A method for taking models to the data
• Inflation Persistence
• Using the generalized Schur form to solve a multivariate linear rational expectations model
• A monetary business cycle model with unemployment

Cited In (16)

• An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
• A monetary business cycle model with unemployment
• Optimal Disability Insurance with Moral Hazards: Absenteeism, Presenteeism, and Shirking
• Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
• Do firms provide wage insurance against shocks?
• Efficient unemployment insurance and the cost of borrowing
• Should unemployment insurance vary with the unemployment rate? Theory and evidence
• Optimal unemployment insurance in GE: a robust calibration approach
• Erratum: An analysis of non-insurance work incentives
• Worker turnover and unemployment insurance
• Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard*
• Employment and wages with sector-specific shocks and worker moral hazard
• Optimal entry decision of unemployment insurance under partial information
• A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection
• Unemployment insurance and moral hazard in employment
• Pricing of unemployment insurance products with doubly stochastic Markov chains

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