Unemployment insurance in a sticky-price model with worker moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2011.03.002MaRDI QIDQ550832zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gregory E. Givens

Publication date 13 July 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://capone.mtsu.edu/berc/working/insurance.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

sticky pricesunemploymentefficiency wagespartial insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 777596 (Why is no real title available?)
• A method for taking models to the data
• A monetary business cycle model with unemployment
• Inflation Persistence
• Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
• Methods to estimate dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models
• Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory*
• Using the generalized Schur form to solve a multivariate linear rational expectations model

Cited in

(16)

• Pricing of unemployment insurance products with doubly stochastic Markov chains
• An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
• A monetary business cycle model with unemployment
• Optimal Disability Insurance with Moral Hazards: Absenteeism, Presenteeism, and Shirking
• Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
• Efficient unemployment insurance and the cost of borrowing
• Do firms provide wage insurance against shocks?
• Optimal unemployment insurance in GE: a robust calibration approach
• Should unemployment insurance vary with the unemployment rate? Theory and evidence
• Erratum: An analysis of non-insurance work incentives
• Worker turnover and unemployment insurance
• Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard*
• Employment and wages with sector-specific shocks and worker moral hazard
• Optimal entry decision of unemployment insurance under partial information
• A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection
• Unemployment insurance and moral hazard in employment

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