Multiprincipals multiagents incentive design

DOI10.1007/PL00013693MaRDI QIDQ5944738zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rudolf Kerschbamer, Semih Koray

Publication date 24 March 2003

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00013693, http://hdl.handle.net/11693/24768

zbMATH Keywords

advverse selectionequilibriummultiprincipals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Review text

The authors study the design of incentives through contractual arrangements in a model consisting of two ex ante identical principal-agent pairs. The notion of an epsilon contracting equilibrium has been introduced to predict the outcome of the principals contract game, which enables to approximate the discontinuities of payoff functions. It is also shown that in spite of the symmetric structure of the principals game, there is no symmetry in pure strategies. A number of theorems and propositions are established for the solution. No experiments are presented in the paper.

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Cited in

(6)

• Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray
• To sell public or private goods
• The principal-agent problem with adaptive players
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Uncertainty aversion and theory of incomplete contract
• A Mechanism Design Approach to Dynamic Price-Based Control of Multi-Agent Systems

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