Granting an exit option to conduct an audit

DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2009.00347.XzbMATH Open1225.91037OpenAlexW2166087802MaRDI QIDQ3096865FDOQ3096865

Authors: Dongsoo Shin, Sungho Yun 

Publication date: 15 November 2011

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2009.00347.x

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zbMATH Keywords

principalagentauditingsoft informationexit option

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies

Cited In (4)

• Strategic audit policies without commitment
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• External Audit System of Project Evaluation: Optimal Structure and Audit Quality
• Why costless auditing may reduce social welfare

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