Granting an exit option to conduct an audit

DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2009.00347.XMaRDI QIDQ3096865zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dongsoo Shin, Sungho Yun

Publication date 15 November 2011

Published in Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2009.00347.x

zbMATH Keywords

principalagentauditingsoft informationexit option

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder

Cited in

(4)

• Why costless auditing may reduce social welfare
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• External Audit System of Project Evaluation: Optimal Structure and Audit Quality
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