GRANTING AN EXIT OPTION TO CONDUCT AN AUDIT

DOI10.1111/j.1467-8586.2009.00347.xzbMath1225.91037OpenAlexW2166087802MaRDI QIDQ3096865

Dongsoo Shin, Sungho Yun

Publication date: 15 November 2011

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2009.00347.x

zbMATH Keywords

agentprincipalauditingsoft informationexit option

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case