Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2006.05.008MaRDI QIDQ855314zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Harrison H. C. Cheng

Publication date 7 December 2006

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

revenue rankinglinear bidding modellumber auctionsopen and sealed-bid auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.

Cited in

(20)

• Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement
• On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders
• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions
• Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
• Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
• Open outcry auctions with secret reserve prices: An empirical application to executive auctions of tenant owner's apartments in Sweden
• Asymmetric Auctions
• A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders
• A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
• Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
• Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
• Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale

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