Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
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Publication:855314
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2006.05.008zbMATH Open1141.91394OpenAlexW3124614771MaRDI QIDQ855314FDOQ855314
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.05.008
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Cites Work
Cited In (20)
- On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
- Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale
- Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders
- Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
- Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
- Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
- Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement
- Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
- Open outcry auctions with secret reserve prices: An empirical application to executive auctions of tenant owner's apartments in Sweden
- Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions
- A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
- Asymmetric first price auctions
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