Successful uninformed bidding

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.09.002MaRDI QIDQ705943zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ángel Hernando-Veciana

Publication date 16 February 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://dro.dur.ac.uk/25363/1/25363.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Asymmetric biddersCommon valueMulti-unit auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner
• The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions
• Uninformed bidding in sequential auctions
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information

Cites work

• A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction

Cited in

(7)

• Uninformed bidding in sequential auctions
• Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
• Risky procurement with an insider bidder
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
• Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner

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