Treasury bill auctions: do bidders' cost of funds and winning probability matter?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.06.014MaRDI QIDQ2315411zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Enmeng Liu, Jiapeng Liu, Hong Qiu, Jia Wang

Publication date 5 August 2019

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.06.014

zbMATH Keywords

uniform price auctiondiscriminatory auctionwinning probabilitytreasury securitiescost of funds

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• On the optimality of Treasury Bill auctions
• Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Auctioning divisible goods
• Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions

Cites work

• Auctioning divisible goods
• Auctions of Shares
• Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading

Cited in

(5)

• Valuing dealers' informational advantage: a study of Canadian Treasury auctions
• Comparing the Spanish and the discriminatory auction formats: a discrete model with private information
• Resolving failed banks: uncertainty, multiple bidding and auction design
• Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds
• Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders

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