Treasury bill auctions: do bidders' cost of funds and winning probability matter?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.06.014zbMATH Open1418.91223OpenAlexW2952788869MaRDI QIDQ2315411FDOQ2315411

Authors: Enmeng Liu, Jiapeng Liu, Hong Qiu, Jia Wang 

Publication date: 5 August 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.06.014

Recommendations

• On the optimality of Treasury Bill auctions
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zbMATH Keywords

uniform price auctiondiscriminatory auctionwinning probabilitytreasury securitiescost of funds

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
• Auctioning divisible goods
• Auctions of Shares

Cited In (4)

• Comparing the Spanish and the discriminatory auction formats: a discrete model with private information
• Valuing dealers' informational advantage: a study of Canadian Treasury auctions
• Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds

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