Information design in sequential procurement

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.05.013MaRDI QIDQ2675436zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko, Martin Pollrich

Publication date 23 September 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.013

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscommitmentinformation designprocurementsequential screening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Optimal auction design under non-commitment
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Sequential Information Design
• Commitment in Procurement Contracting

Cites work

• From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening With Positive Selection
• Mechanism design with aftermarkets: cutoff mechanisms
• Optimal auction design under non-commitment

Cited in

(1)

• Sequential Information Design

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