Commitment in Procurement Contracting

DOI10.2307/3440313MaRDI QIDQ3809549zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael H. Riordan, David E. M. Sappington

Publication date 1988

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/3440313

zbMATH Keywords

inefficient productionmonopsonistmultistage procurement processprivate informationsequential contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Commitment contracts
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Cited in

(5)

• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
• A note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation
• Information design in sequential procurement
• Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

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