Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.007zbMath1400.91195OpenAlexW2734133506MaRDI QIDQ2402062

Lucas Maestri

Publication date: 6 September 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

screeningrenegotiationdynamic contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (6)

Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation ⋮ Quality and price personalization under customer recognition: a dynamic monopoly model with contrasting equilibria ⋮ Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller ⋮ Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values ⋮ A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints ⋮ Screening by mode of trade

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal auction design under non-commitment
• Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting
• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Monopoly and product quality
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture: A Strategic Foundation for Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement

This page was built for publication: Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation