Treating symmetric buyers asymmetrically
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Publication:6565724
DOI10.1111/IJET.12394MaRDI QIDQ6565724FDOQ6565724
Authors: Shraman Banerjee
Publication date: 2 July 2024
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Game theory
- Sequential screening
- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
- Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce
- Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules
- Optimal auction design under non-commitment
- Name your own price at priceline.com: strategic bidding and lockout periods
- On asymmetric reserve prices
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