Treating symmetric buyers asymmetrically

DOI10.1111/IJET.12394MaRDI QIDQ6565724zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Shraman Banerjee

Publication date 2 July 2024

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

monopolydynamic pricingasymmetric mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• Game theory
• Name your own price at priceline.com: strategic bidding and lockout periods
• On asymmetric reserve prices
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal auction design under non-commitment
• Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules
• Sequential screening
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1

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