Treating symmetric buyers asymmetrically

DOI10.1111/IJET.12394MaRDI QIDQ6565724zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Shraman Banerjee

Publication date 2 July 2024

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/IJET.12394

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric mechanismdynamic pricingmonopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• Game theory
• Name your own price at priceline.com: strategic bidding and lockout periods
• On asymmetric reserve prices
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal auction design under non-commitment
• Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Sequential screening
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1

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