One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify Stackelberg equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90001-BzbMath0825.90830OpenAlexW2038595514MaRDI QIDQ1196623

Eddie Dekel, Joseph Farrell

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90001-b

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Cites Work

• Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

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