Voting over investment

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(95)00765-2MaRDI QIDQ1817336zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Richard T. Boylan

Publication date 21 April 1997

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(95)00765-2

zbMATH Keywords

capital accumulationgrowth modeldemocratic processdifferent endowmentsdifferent time preferencesmajority vote equilibriasupermajority equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• Voting on Majority Rules
• One Cow, One Vote?
• Voting in a stochastic environment: the case of two groups
• Consistent voting rules for competitive local public goods economies
• Existence of voting-market equilibria

Cites work

• An integration of equilibrium theory and turnpike theory
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Linear Statistical Inference and its Applications
• The Existence of Ramsey Equilibrium

Cited in

(2)

• Capitalist investment and political liberalization
• Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results

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