scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19469
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Publication:3978956
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0732.00025.] Let \(G_ 0\) be a signalling game; \(G\), the extension of \(G\) to include a stage 1 securities market subgame. Let \(S(G_ 0)\) be the sunspot equilibrium payoffs of \(G_ 0\); \(EPC(G)\), the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs of \(G\). The main result of the paper is that if \(S(G_ 0)\) is convex, then \(S(G_ 0)=EPC(G)\). A sufficient condition for this is given by the Amir-Shubik-Yao construction of \(G_ 0\).
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