Oligopoly meets oligopsony: the case of permits

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.04.006zbMATH Open1181.91085OpenAlexW2019261673WikidataQ59212011 ScholiaQ59212011MaRDI QIDQ2655846FDOQ2655846

Authors Franz Wirl

Publication date 26 January 2010

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2009.04.006

zbMATH Keywords

double marginalizationpermit marketoligopoly versus oligopsony

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Recommendations

• Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)
• Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating.
• Interacting oligopolistic and oligopsonistic Cournot markets
• Market power in output and emissions trading
• Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Cites work

• Auctions of Shares
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty

Cited in

(2)

• Can double auctions control monopoly and monopsony power in emissions trading markets?
• Can allowing to trade permits enhance welfare in mixed oligopoly?

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