Playing against no-regret players

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2023.01.005zbMath1525.91038arXiv2202.09364MaRDI QIDQ6161902

Maurizio D'Andrea

Publication date: 28 June 2023

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.09364

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesStackelberg equilibriano-regret algorithms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Cites Work

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