Playing against no-regret players

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2023.01.005MaRDI QIDQ6161902zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Maurizio D'Andrea

Publication date 28 June 2023

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.09364

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesStackelberg equilibriano-regret algorithms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3128728 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Randomization Rule for Selecting Forecasts
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• A general class of adaptive strategies
• Approachability, regret and calibration: implications and equivalences
• Asymptotic calibration
• How to use expert advice
• Potential-based algorithms in on-line prediction and game theory
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies

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