A general internal regret-free strategy

DOI10.1007/s13235-015-0143-5zbMath1348.91087OpenAlexW1997153197MaRDI QIDQ291209

Eilon Solan, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 7 June 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0143-5

zbMATH Keywords

approachabilityimperfect monitoringinternal no regretno regretresponse correspondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (3)

Approachability with delayed information ⋮ Approachability with constraints ⋮ Opportunistic Approachability and Generalized No-Regret Problems

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