Approachability with delayed information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:894030
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.010zbMATH Open1330.91046OpenAlexW2005809986MaRDI QIDQ894030FDOQ894030
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.010
Recommendations
- On a unified framework for approachability with full or partial monitoring
- Approachability, regret and calibration: implications and equivalences
- Stochastic games with information lag
- A primal condition for approachability with partial monitoring
- Approachability of convex sets in games with partial monitoring
Decision theory for games (91A35) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Conditional universal consistency.
- Minimizing regret: The general case
- A general internal regret-free strategy
- Internal Regret with Partial Monitoring. Calibration-Based Optimal Algorithms
- Approachability with bounded memory
- Approachability in a Two-person Game
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Approachability
- Approachability of convex sets in games with partial monitoring
- Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
- Calibration with Many Checking Rules
- Stochastic games with information lag
Cited In (4)
This page was built for publication: Approachability with delayed information
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q894030)
