A primal condition for approachability with partial monitoring
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Publication:482547
DOI10.3934/jdg.2014.1.447zbMath1314.91028arXiv1305.5399MaRDI QIDQ482547
Shie Mannor, Gilles Stoltz, Vianney Perchet
Publication date: 5 January 2015
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.5399
68T05: Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
Cites Work
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- Approachability of convex sets in games with partial monitoring
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
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- Strategies for Prediction Under Imperfect Monitoring
- Internal Regret with Partial Monitoring. Calibration-Based Optimal Algorithms
- A first course on zero-sum repeated games