Recommendations
Cites work
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Approachability
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Approachability in a Two-person Game
- Approachability in infinite dimensional spaces
- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- Convex Analysis
- Game theory. Translated from the Hebrew by Ziv Hellman and edited by Mike Borns
- Motzkin decomposition of closed convex sets
- Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information
- Prediction, Learning, and Games
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information
- The Game of Normal Numbers
- Zero-sum repeated games: recent advances and new links with differential games
Cited in
(13)- Weak Approachability
- Repeated games and qualitative differential games: approachability and comparison of strategies
- Approachability with constraints
- Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games
- Weak approachability of convex sets in absorbing games
- Approachability in repeated games: Computational aspects and a Stackelberg variant
- A primal condition for approachability with partial monitoring
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Approachability
- Approachable sets of vector payoffs in stochastic games
- Recent contributions to linear semi-infinite optimization
- Approachability in infinite dimensional spaces
- Attainability in repeated games with vector payoffs
- Recent contributions to linear semi-infinite optimization: an update
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