Asymmetric information may protect the commons: the welfare benefits of uninformed regulators

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.09.032MaRDI QIDQ2453049zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Felix Munoz-Garcia, Ana Espínola-Arredondo

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.09.032

zbMATH Keywords

commonsentry deterrencesignalingwelfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

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• Comparing allocations under asymmetric information: Coase theorem revisited
• On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information

Cites work

• Entry deterrence and signaling in a nonrenewable resource model
• Entry Deterrence in the Commons

Cited in

(1)

• Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring

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