Entry Deterrence in the Commons

DOI10.2307/2527067MaRDI QIDQ4301667zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stephen Polasky, C. F. Mason

Publication date 14 August 1994

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ded9f1acb84306fc74f827719a68706c99377878

zbMATH Keywords

common property resource modelpotential entry of a rival

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Entry deterrence and overexploitation of the fishery
• Entry deterrence and signaling in a nonrenewable resource model
• Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
• Harvest uncertainty and the tragedy of the commons
• Sole owner harvesting policies under the threat of entry: A two-stage linear game

Cited in

(11)

• Entry deterrence and signaling in a nonrenewable resource model
• Entry deterrence and overexploitation of the fishery
• Asymmetric information may protect the commons: the welfare benefits of uninformed regulators
• Cooperation in the commons
• A note on oligopoly exploitation of common-pool renewable resources
• Monopoly, potential competition and private stock information in exhaustible resource markets
• Effort subsidies and entry deterrence in transboundary fisheries.
• Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
• FAILING FIRM DEFENCE WITH ENTRY DETERRENCE
• Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey
• When additional resource stocks reduce welfare

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