Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user

DOI10.1007/S11538-021-00980-7MaRDI QIDQ2070283zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors József Garay, Tamás F. Móri

Publication date 24 January 2022

Published in Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11538-021-00980-7

zbMATH Keywords

dynamical playeriterated gameMarkov modelmixed strategypopulation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited in

(2)

• The role of mixed strategies in spatial evolutionary games
• A 2 2 -best response stochastic two-step game

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